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Abstract
Background: Design and test the reliability of a web-based system for multicenter, real-time
collection of data in the emergency department (ED), under waiver of authorization, in compliance
with HIPAA.
Methods: This was a phase I, two-hospital study of patients undergoing evaluation for possible
pulmonary embolism. Data were collected by on-duty clinicians on an HTML data collection form
(prospective e-form), populated using either a personal digital assistant (PDA) or personal
computer (PC). Data forms were uploaded to a central, offsite server using secure socket protocol
transfer. Each form was assigned a unique identifier, and all PHI data were encrypted, but were
password-accessible by authorized research personnel to complete a follow-up e-form.
Results: From April 15, 2003-April 15 2004, 1022 prospective e-forms and 605 follow-up e-forms
were uploaded. Complexities of PDA use compelled clinicians to use PCs in the ED for data entry
f o r  m o s t  f o r m s .  N o  d a t a  w e r e  l o s t  a n d  s e r v er log query revealed no unauthorized entry.
Prospectively obtained PHI data, encrypted upon server upload, were successfully decrypted using
password-protected access to allow follow-up without difficulty in 605 cases. Non-PHI data from
prospective and follow-up forms were available to the study investigators via standard file transfer
protocol.
Conclusions: Data can be accurately collected from on-duty clinicians in the ED using real-time,
PC-Internet data entry in compliance with the Privacy Rule. Deidentification-reidentification of PHI
was successfully accomplished by a password-protected encryption-deencryption mechanism to
permit follow-up by approved research personnel.
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Background
The ability of medical researchers to obtain and store elec-
tronic clinical data was complicated by requirements of
the Patient Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") of 1996 in title 45
of the Federal Register, parts 160, subparts A and E of part
164 [1-3]. The HIPAA creates a conflict for investigators.
The law specifies that 18 data elements, known as pro-
tected health identifiers (PHI), that could be used to iden-
tify the patient, must be adequately protected from
disclosure. However, to allow follow-up, the investigator
usually must collect PHI. In the most conservative inter-
pretation of the Privacy Rule, investigators must obtain
written informed consent and written authorization to
collect PHI. In the hectic setting of the emergency depart-
ment, the step of obtaining written authorization can bias
the data sample [4]. The Privacy Rule does allow PHI to be
collected without written authorization if the institutional
Privacy Board grants waiver of authorization. Waiver of
authorization requires special handling of PHI.
Existing electronic data collection methods are limited in
their ability to centralize data in a fashion that expedites
data sharing while remaining in compliance with HIPAA.
For example, commercial spreadsheets that run on Win-
dows® do not mandate user identification, do not parti-
tion and encrypt sensitive data, and do not maintain a
record and audit trail of use. Accordingly, we developed a
comprehensive electronic system for clinicians to capture
clinical research data from the bedside using commer-
cially available hardware and data upload over the Inter-
net. The system was programmed with multiple security
steps and authentication procedures to maintain data
security and privacy.
We tested the hypothesis that real-time clinical data can
be obtained from clinicians in multiple hospitals using
electronic data collection stored in an off-site server,
under waiver of Authorization, while remaining in com-
pliance with the Privacy Rule. This study represents the
development and implementation phase of an ongoing
multicenter study to collect prospective and follow-up
clinical data from patients undergoing evaluation for pul-
monary embolism in the emergency department. The spe-
cific aims of this study were to: 1. Test the feasibility of
real-time, electronic data collection on personal digital
assistants and personal computers in the emergency
department setting in two hospitals. 2. Test if the system
would correctly upload protected health information
(PHI) in a secure and encrypted fashion, but allow follow-
up to be performed by selected individuals using pass-
word-protected access to PHI.
Methods
Human subjects and Institutional approval
Patients were enrolled from two hospitals in Charlotte,
NC: Carolinas Medical Center Main and Carolinas Medi-
cal Center University. The clinical protocol was approved
under waiver of informed consent and waiver of authori-
zation by the Carolinas HealthCare Institutional Review
Board and the Institutional Privacy Board in accordance
with the published guidelines of the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) [5], which were
reviewed by Annas [6].
Because of institutional sensitivity about maintaining
compliance with the privacy rule, this project required
intensive planning and due diligence. Over a 6-month
period, the authors scheduled several meetings with the
Director of Privacy in Clinical Research, the hospital's
Assistant Vice President of Privacy, and the Director of
Information Security to discuss the protocol and meth-
ods. These individuals had oversight for privacy issues for
both hospitals. Then, to facilitate the process of gaining
assistance and approval from the Information Systems
Department in implementing the technical aspects (soft-
ware deployment and firewall access) at both hospitals,
we obtained a letter of approval from each of these indi-
viduals to physically show to technical support personnel.
All patients in this study underwent evaluation for pulmo-
nary embolism. The method of selection and diagnosis
have been described previously [7]. For each patient, two
electronic data forms ("e-forms") were (or will be) com-
pleted. The first was a prospective e-form that was com-
pleted in real-time in the emergency department by the
clinician in charge of the patient's care. The second e-form
encoded follow-up data, and was completed 45 days or
more after the prospective form. The follow-up e-form
was completed by one of two research associates. This
study was non-interventional.
System overview
This system was designed to allow data to be transferred
from multiple sites and stored on one server using techni-
cal requirements described in part 160 and 164 of the Pri-
vacy Rule. Figure 1 shows a schematic of the overall
system structure with the hypothetical participation of
four sites. According to published recommendations of
the DHHS, the overarching requirement for collection of
databases under waiver of authorization is to ensure de-
identification of data. The DHHS specifies that this can be
done either by the "safe harbor" approach, which entails
removal, or the "statistical probability" method, which for
practical purposes, incorporates data encryption/de-
encryption techniques. The present system uses the statis-
tical probability method, whereby the PHI data are sub-
jected to 128-key bit encryption prior to upload on theBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2004, 4:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/4/17
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Schematic of system structure Figure 1
Schematic of system structure.
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server, but are linked to a non-PHI unique identifier (e.g.,
CMC0001) that allows joining of non-PHI data with PHI
data for the purpose of conducting follow-up (see the star
in the middle of the schematic in Figure 1). This step
allows a research coordinator with the appropriate login
and password to access de-encrypted (re-identified) data.
In the final step, an FTP protocol was used to download
the non-PHI follow-up data together with the correct pro-
spective data for each patient. Both the prospective and
follow-up data were exported in table form, one row per
patient. In summary, authorized research personnel from
each site had password-protected access to PHI of patients
from their hospital only, while unauthorized personnel
could access non-PHI study data via an FTP. An example
of the latter would occur in Figure 1 if the site PI from hos-
pital 1 were interested in viewing research data collected
at hospital 3. The description of the individual elements
of the system that follows is presented in the order that the
study was conducted.
Data entry form structure
The trigger for data entry was the decision to order a diag-
nostic test to rule out pulmonary embolism in a sympto-
matic emergency department patient. Patient data were
entered on the prospective e-form. The e-forms were pro-
grammed using hypertext markup language (HTML) in
conjunction with active server pages (ASP) and Standard
Query Language (SQL). The prospective and follow-up e-
forms are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The prospective e-
form contained a total of 70 fields for data entry including
text strings, pull-downs, and click portals. The explicit def-
inition of each field was provided by embedded text that
could be viewed by mouse click over an adjacent question
mark. These terms are defined in the Table 1. When the
user executed an e-form upload, the server-side ASP code
queried data fields for presence of an entry and validity of
the entry. For parametric data, such as heart rate, the side-
code query interrogated whether numerals had been
entered and whether the number fell within a defined
range. For example, the heart rate entry had to fall within
21 and 200 beats per minute. (If the investigator encoun-
tered a patient with a parameter outside of the allowed
range, he or she could click an email link to notify the
study administrator, who could override the system to
make the entry.) Likewise, if the form contained a missing
field, or a nonsensical entry from keystroke error (e.g. a
heart rate of "t3"), the server would not load the form, and
an error message directed the clinician to the field requir-
ing correction and highlighted the erroneous entry in red
shading. Once the field was corrected, the form could be
uploaded.
To test for data validity in the prospective forms uploaded
by clinicians, two authors independently examined each
of 70 fields for all patients uploaded. We evaluated for
blank cells, nonsensical character entry, or numeric entry
that fell outside the predefined ranges.
Real-time data entry
Forms were completed by attending physicians (N = 22),
resident physicians (N = 20), and physician assistants (N
= 6) in two emergency departments while the patient of
interest was still in the emergency department. Prior to
Reproduction of the prospective e-form as seen by the user Figure 2
Reproduction of the prospective e-form as seen by the user.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2004, 4:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/4/17
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study deployment, each clinician was individually trained
in a 10-minute session by the study principal investigator
using a pre-defined protocol, and each clinician received
a follow-up letter that summarized the training session.
Data forms could be accessed in the emergency depart-
ment using designated Internet-connected personal com-
puters within patient care areas, or could be completed
using individually owned personal digital assistants using
the Pocket PC® operating system followed by synchro-
nized upload to the hosted server. All clinicians owned a
compatible PDA. The authors and staff assistants provided
technical support to assist clinicians in the process of
downloading the prospective e-form to their PDAs and
uploading completed e-forms to the study's central server
using commercial software (Microsoft ActiveSynch®  v.
3.5). The clinicians were shown that prospective data
entry forms could also be accessed through a URL hyper-
link that was posted on the desktop of all Internet-con-
nected computers in both emergency departments. When
the user clicked the hyperlink, this action routed the user
through the firewall directly to the hosted server for this
study. All computers ran Windows 95 or higher, with eth-
ernet connection to a T3 44.736 Mbps channel.
Upon opening the first web page, the user viewed a list of
clinician names (Figure 4). The clinician then chose his or
her name and opened a new, blank prospective e-form.
No login was required to access or upload the form, but
the central server was programmed to accept uploaded e-
forms only from Internet provider addresses of the com-
puters in the two emergency departments. When each
new, complete prospective e-form was uploaded to the
hosted server, the server encoded the e-form with a unique
identification number bearing the initials of the hospital
where data originated, the sequence number and clinician
who entered the data. (e.g., CMC023JAK).
Privacy controls
Multiple methods were used to ensure that protected
health information would not be subject to unauthorized
access, viewing or hijacking. When clinicians entered data
in the emergency department, the server polled the form
for inactivity exceeding 30 minutes, at which time the
page would automatically close without being uploaded.
We anticipated scenarios where a clinician would enter
data on a prospective form that would need to be revised
as a result of updated information (e.g., access to
additional medical records, or arrival of family). To allow
for such editing, the clinician could re-access any
prospective form for a period of 60 minutes after initial
upload, provided that the Internet provider address of the
computer was the same as the computer from which the
form originated. After 60 minutes, the prospective e-form
could be altered only by a study administrator. All data
were transferred using secure socket link (SSL) protocol.
Reproduction of the follow-up e-form as seen by the user Figure 3
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The central server (Win2000 OS) was located off-site at a
large commercial web hosting facility (NTT/Verio Inc).
Upon upload, all fields containing any of the 18 elements
of that constitute PHI were subjected to 128 key-bit
encryption. Data were stored in relational tables. To allow
data analysis for research purposes, the study PI could
access stored by file transfer protocol and exported into a
format compatible with commercial software (e.g., Micro-
soft Access®, Seattle WA). However, all PHI data fields
were remained encrypted.
Follow-up data entry
Patients were then followed prospectively to determine
outcome at 45 days. The follow-up data were entered by
an IRB and privacy board approved, designated research
coordinator. Because follow-up mandated access to PHI
data, a separate web page was developed to allow the
study coordinator to have administrative access to the
necessary data. The research coordinator would type the
appropriate URL address and then view a login page (Fig-
ure 5). The research coordinator could obtain password-
protected access to the list of all uploaded prospective
data forms (Figure 6), and upon mouse click of the "Fol-
low-up Patient" button, the follow-up form was displayed
with the required data to assist in follow-up, including
patient name, medical record number, social security
number, and telephone number (see top of Figure 2). This
system thus allowed upload of prospective and follow-up
Table 1: Dictionary of variables visible to the user via hover buttons
Hospital of Choice – The hospital where the patient says he or she receives his or her care. If the patient agrees that the study hospital is his or 
her hospital of choice, this means that in the patient's opinion, he or she agrees to return to the study hospital for persistent symptoms in the next 
45 days.
Vital signs – Measured in the ED using local standards and FDA-approved devices. SaO2% must be made with the patient breathing room air or 
the lowest tolerable rate of oxygen administration.
Dyspnea – Patient perception of difficulty breathing at the time of evaluation. Includes sensation described as shortness of breath, breathlessness, 
labored breathing, trouble breathing, not breathing right.
Pleuritic Chest Pain – Focal pain in the thorax located inferior to the transverse axis through the clavicles extending to the costal margin. The 
pain must change with breathing and must not be reproduced by palpation.
Substernal Chest Pain – Pain located behind the sternum that is not reproduced with palpation.
Chest pain Reproduced with Palpation – Thoracic pain that increases when palpated gently and the patient agrees that the elicited pain feels 
similar to the pain that he or she is experiencing.
Leg or Arm Swelling – Asymmetry observed on gross inspection. Does not require measurement or presence of edema.
Wheezing – Determined by auscultation by any healthcare provider either in prehospital or ED setting.
Alternative diagnosis – Another specific disease process for which an ICD-9 code or set of codes exist, including pneumonia, cardiac ischemia, 
CHF, bronchospasm, muscle strain, acute bronchitis, biliary disease, pneumothorax, aortic dissection, pericarditis, costochondritis. Descriptive 
diagnoses of atypical chest pain or chest pain of unknown etiology, or Chest pain NOS are not sufficient to be considered alternative diagnosis. 
Likewise, purely psychiatric diagnoses such as anxiety or fibromyalgia are not to be considered as alternative diagnoses.
Physician estimate of PTP – The probability that the patient has PE on the day of evaluation.
Past Medical History terms. All terms are based upon the clinician's best estimate of the presence or absence of each condition based upon 
data available during the ED shift. Data sources may include patient perception, family perception, oral or facsimile communication with other 
clinicians, evaluation of written or electronic medical records.
COPD – In the appropriate clinical setting (eg, history of smoking) a patient affirms yes to the question, "have you been told you have emphysema 
or damage to your lungs from smoking that has required medical treatment" This diagnosis does require spirometry results.
Surgery in past 4 weeks: Includes any surgery requiring general anesthesia.
Trauma in past 4 weeks: Any traumatic injury requiring hospitalization for >24 hours or causing fracture requiring stabilization in an ED. Does 
not include minor laceration repair, scrapes, bruises, concussion, whiplash or soft tissue injuries that did not warrant admission
Coronary Artery Disease – Coronary stenoses diagnosed either by clinical grounds if drug therapy is given, or by coronary imaging. Includes 
prior MI, prior stenting or CABG.
CHF – Systolic or diastolic heart failure. Can be based upon clinical diagnosis if drug therapy is given. Does not include diagnosis of CHF made for 
the first time on the day of enrollment.
DVT or PE. Requires that the patient was treated with either caval interruption, or warfarin or fractionated heparin anticoagulation for more than 
11 weeks.
Malignancy – History of cancer. Decision to term the presence of cancer as "treated and inactive" means the patient perceives that the disease is 
in remission and the clinician has no evidence to the contrary. If evidence of previously unknown metastases is found in the ED, then the clinician 
uses the information at hand to code the malignancy status.
Immobility – Pathological restriction in body movement. Includes bed-bound patients who cannot or do not walk for periods exceeding 48 hours. 
Also includes any patient in a cast or with an external fixator in place.
End stage disease – Any disease process, such as AIDs, cancer, advanced incurable lung or heart disease with life expectancy < 6 months.
Follow-up e-form terms
Sepsis – As defined by American College of Chest Physicians
Discharge Diagnosis – Based upon written diagnoses and ICD 10 coding
Troponin – pull down box allows multiple choices of results for either troponin I or C testing.
Pressor support – >5 micrograms of dopamine per kg per min or any use of norepinephrine or epinephrine infusionBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2004, 4:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/4/17
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e-forms from multiple hospitals, while research coordina-
tors with IRB and privacy board approval could view the
minimum PHI required to perform follow-up at their hos-
pital. Research coordinators could not view PHI from
other hospitals. However, using a password-protected file
transfer protocol, the central study PI could view the non-
PHI clinical data input by all participating hospitals, with-
out access to PHI from any hospital.
The information required to populate the follow-up e-
form required the research coordinator to perform a
standardized review of a comprehensive medical record
database maintained by the hospital. The first database
was a central electronic record storing system where labo-
ratory and radiology results and any transcriptions of dic-
tated clinician notes and optical scanned images could be
found for the entire hospital network. This allowed the
evaluation of any return visit to the hospital system,
(inpatient, ED, clinic or other outpatient visit) to deter-
Login web page for clinicians to access prospective e-forms Figure 4
Login web page for clinicians to access prospective e-forms.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2004, 4:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/4/17
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mine if the patient had any of the outcomes of interest in
the follow-up form. If no follow-up data were available
within the hospital system to prove the patient was alive
at 45 days, then the follow-up protocol required query of
the public social security master death index to determine
if a death certificate had been filed for the patient. Finally,
if no valid follow-up were documented by electronic data-
base search, we then attempted to contact the patient
through a previously described, stepwise procedure, con-
sisting of a mailed questionnaire, followed by a telephone
call, if necessary [7].
When all of the data required for the follow-up form were
obtained and input into the form, the research coordina-
tor would complete the form and press the "check form
for completeness" button. This would activate a system to
ensure that all necessary follow-up data were entered. For
example, every patient had to have a valid 45-day follow-
up, either in the form of a documented follow-up to a
clinic, telephone follow-up with the patient, or confirma-
tion of patient death within 45 days.
Results
The system was fully implemented on April 15, 2003. As
of April 15, 2004, prospective data forms were uploaded
from 1022 patients evaluated for acute pulmonary embo-
lism. Prospective data have been entered by 42 clinicians
and 6 physician assistants from two hospitals in
Charlotte, NC. The primary technical barrier to imple-
mentation was the process of loading and using the pro-
spective e-forms on a personal digital assistant. All 48
clinicians required individual help and training, of over
one hour each to show them how to install the e-form on
their PDAs. This impedance was compounded by real-
time difficulties associated with stylus use on a small PDA
screen, followed by difficulties with uploading to the web-
site from the PDA led to abandonment of this method of
data entry. Out of 48 clinicians, only 6 successfully
uploaded more than one e-form from the PDA. Only 12
of 1022 uploaded e-forms originated from a PDA.
The primary technical barrier to implementation on the
personal computers included maintaining the URL icon
on desktops in the ED (it was occasionally removed by
unknown persons). This problem was solved by the per-
manent link on the hospital's intranet home page. In two
separate instances, clinicians reported that they had pop-
ulated the e-form, attempted to submit, and for unknown
reasons, were unable to upload the e-form, and they had
to reenter the data and resubmit the e-form. The server has
maintained a log of all successive e-forms uploaded by
each clinician. No uploaded prospective forms have been
lost or deleted. The side-server system was designed to pre-
vent e-form upload with missing or erroneous data.
To examine if this system properly, two observers
reviewed the eight parametric field entries (age, heart rate,
respiratory rate, systolic blood pressure, pulse oximetry,
height, weight and temperature) that were key-entered by
Login web page to allow secure authenticated access to fol- low-up e-forms Figure 5
Login web page to allow secure authenticated access to fol-
low-up e-forms.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2004, 4:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/4/17
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clinicians for 1022 patients. Validity required that both
observers agree that the entry was a real number within
the prespecified range of the parameter. In 44/8176 fields
of 12 patients (0.6%), two observers deemed the paramet-
ric field entry to be useless for statistical analysis. Stated
another way, these data would be coded as missing after
data cleaning were completed. However, no categorical
data were missing or erroneous. As a result, 1010/1022
(98.8%) of prospective e-forms had usable data in all 70
fields.
Ninety-four percent of all 1022 patients have reported the
site hospital to be their hospital of choice. Follow-up
forms (Figure 3) have been completed and uploaded on
605 of 1022 patients. Using existing hospital-approved
login and authentication procedures, research personnel
were able to access necessary databases from their home
computers. Thus, using their personal Internet connection
and private telephone line, the research associates were
able to complete follow-up forms from home. Follow-up
forms were completed in an average of 20 ± 12 minutes.
Follow-up has revealed that all prospective e-forms were
authentic, and each was completed on an emergency
department patient who underwent at least one clinical
test for pulmonary embolism. No bogus forms were
detected during follow-up to date. This demonstrated a
low likelihood of an unauthorized person generating a
spoofed form on one of the designated computers in the
ED treatment area, given that the automatic control sys-
tem would not allow a form to be uploaded until all 70
fields are completed.
All uploaded prospective and follow-up data were
obtained by the central PI using file transfer protocol and
were inputted into a spreadsheet without difficulty. Figure
7 shows a screenshot illustrating a partial view of the
downloaded study data, including the appearance of the
PHI fields after encryption as well as unencrypted data.
The purpose of this figure is to demonstrate that the cen-
tral PI could have access to necessary study data from all
sites while remaining blinded to PHI data. The "study ID"
field represents the unique identifier used to re-identify
PHI data.
Query of the server log revealed no evidence of website
hijacking or other intrusion. The server computer which
houses the study database and runs the web application
uses the Windows® Server 2003 operating system. The
only means of electronic access to the server is via hyper-
text transfer protocol (HTTP) and file transfer protocol
(FTP). Both of these system services log all requests made
to their ports. An example log entry is shown in the
appendix.
Discussion
The step of obtaining written Authorization to comply
with HIPAA can impart a selection bias in registries
intended to study acute disease processes [4]. In section
164.512(i), the Privacy Rule allows for waiver of Authori-
zation when the "research could not practicably be con-
ducted without the waiver" and the "use of the PHI
involves no more than a minimal risk to the privacy of
individuals." The present report tests a system designed to
collect clinical data in real-time from patients with acute
diseases at multiple hospitals, including a mechanism to
User view after successful authentication Figure 6
User view after successful authentication. From this list, the desired follow-up e-forms can be opened and populated.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2004, 4:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/4/17
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facilitate follow-up, while protecting the privacy of the
participants.
The first research objective was to determine if PDAs
would represent an efficient and secure mechanism for cli-
nicians to record real-time data at the bedside in the
emergency department setting. Our experience in this
phase I, two-hospital study demonstrated that PDAs pre-
sented unexpected complexities that eroded our enthusi-
asm. The clients were clinicians with variable levels of
technical sophistication. Despite our use of a relatively
standard process, clinicians found it difficult to download
the e-form from the website onto their PDAs, and many
needed help from the study authors. Clinicians frequently
forgot to bring their PDA devices to work, and during the
one-year course of this study, 10 of 48 clinicians bought
new PDA devices. Clinicians consistently reported diffi-
culty with the small screen size and data entry with a sty-
lus. Unfortunately, we did not quantify this opinion using
a structured survey. We believe this represents the first
published experience at using PDAs to collect research
data in the emergency department setting. Our results are
somewhat less positive than other studies that have
reported the use of hand-held computers to maintain clin-
ical databases [8,9]. However, Lu and colleagues previ-
ously recognized similar barriers to physician use of PDAs
[10]. We emphasize that our protocol was preplanned,
adequately budgeted, and technically supported to dis-
Reproduction of sample data as viewed by the central study PI after file transfer protocol Figure 7
Reproduction of sample data as viewed by the central study PI after file transfer protocol. The non-encrypted patient data, 
such as age, race and vital signs were obscured by pixellation by the author.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2004, 4:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/4/17
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seminate the e-form via the PDA. Unfortunately, we did
not perform preplanned measurements to explain this
failure. We cannot conclude inferiority of the PDA versus
other methods (e.g., paper forms or PC platform) for data
collection accuracy inasmuch as we did not compare key
quality index data (e.g., comparison rate of compliance,
missed data, key errors, lost forms) between methods.
Thus, we can only explain the failure of the PDA mecha-
nism in the broad terminology of "it lacked feasibility."
The second objective was a relatively complex task
intended to determine if the system would allow prospec-
tive and follow-up data collection over the Internet in
compliance with the requirements of the Privacy Rule.
From a functional standpoint, we sought to determine if
the system would allow us to protect the data fields that
needed to be protected, but allow the non-sensitive data
to be accessed by study personnel who did not have local
IRB approval. This was accomplished while maintaining
strict security standards at each step of data transfer (see
Figure 1). Data were uploaded from designated Internet
provider addresses via secure socket link protocol and
stored in a database on an offsite hosted server that was
protected by several layers. No study data could be
accessed without a password. Further, the system man-
dated specific password-protected access to PHI only by
IRB- and privacy board-approved individuals at each hos-
pital. This mechanism was designed facilitate the acquisi-
tion of patient follow-up data at participating hospitals.
However, the central study PI could download the study
data of interest via a separate password-protected file
transfer protocol, but the PHI data were encrypted (see
Figure 7). Because the PHI data were stored on the server
after 128 keybit encryption, even in the event of unau-
thorized data access (hacking), the hijacker would be una-
ble to view the PHI.
Although a large number of commercial systems are avail-
able for storing clinical data, most are designed and mar-
keted explicitly for the billing process. In contrast, from
the perspective of research, relatively little has been pub-
lished on the design and implementation of a web-based
system to allow collection of clinical data in a multicenter
trial design [11,12]. We believe this is the first report of
successful web-based clinical data collection under waiver
of Authorization and in compliance with CFR 45, parts
160 and 164. This phase I project was limited to two hos-
pitals in the same city, both covered under the same IRB.
However, we submit that the system is ready to be
expanded to other hospitals in the second phase of the
study.
This system was designed to be a reasonably comprehen-
sive tool to obtain key information about the beliefs of a
clinician at the time of test ordering. Here, we refer to the
clinician's beliefs as what they thought were the values of
certain specific clinical data that are commonly used to
estimate the pretest probability of pulmonary embolism.
To capture these beliefs in real time, the system cannot
default to a retrospective review of the patient's chart, or
having the clinician complete the form after a shift.
Within the emergency department setting, the flow of
knowledge is dynamic for each patient. As a consequence
of time urgency, emergency clinicians often must decide
to order expensive imaging tests based upon limited,
changing, and sometimes erroneous information. Occa-
sionally, clinical information becomes updated after an
expensive radiological test has been done (e.g., a family
member arrives with new information, or medical records
arrive from another facility by facsimile). Accordingly, the
data collection instrument must accurately capture the
information that the clinician uses to motivate his or her
test ordering behavior, rather than to collect data after the
test results have returned, and more complete medical
records may have arrived. 
This report represents a phase I study. For the second
phase, we will deploy this system to 10 US hospitals to
allow collection of data from 5000 patients. The ultimate
goal of this project is to collect a large, multicenter data-
base, as the substrate for a mathematical model to gener-
ate a pretest probability of pulmonary embolism based
upon beliefs of many clinicians.
Conclusions
Research data can be successfully collected, entered and
uploaded to a hosted server by emergency physicians
working in different emergency departments, and in
compliance with the Privacy Rule. Use of server side con-
trols to test for data validity ensured that 98.8% of
uploaded forms contained complete data usable for statis-
tical analysis. The PHI data were successfully encrypted
and deencrypted using password access to allow follow-
up at a later date. Server log query demonstrated no evi-
dence of intrusion or data loss, suggesting that data were
securely stored.
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Appendix
Example of a log entry for the HTTP system service
208.10.156.69 – [02/Mar/2004:23:55:55 +0000] "POST /
pestudy/peadmin.asp HTTP/1.1" 302 1349 "https://
www.breathquant.com/pestudy/peadmin.asp" "Mozilla/
4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)"
The IP address of the HTTP requesting browser is
208.10.156.69 and the resource requested is the ASP file
https://www.breathquant.com/pestudy/peadmin.asp. For
the FTP system service this would be a typical log entry
208.10.156.69 – generic [06/Aug/2003:17:00:14 +0000] "
[22786]USER generic FTP" 331 0 "-" "-"
The IP address of the HTTP requesting browser is
208.10.156.69 and the USER identity that was logged in
was "generic". Both these log files are scanned once a
week to look for any suspicious requests. To date there
have been no identified intrusion or hijack attempts on
the specific study database. As an HTTP responding server
on the public Internet, the web (HTTP) server program
does receive many well identified "virus spreading"
requests which it denies and whose denials are logged.
One such "virus related" request common to all web logs
today is
61.100.6.181 – [01/May/2004:11:30:52 +0000] "GET /
scripts/nsiislog.dll HTTP/1.1" 404 3806
This example virus was developed to attack a vulnerability
which existed in Microsoft Web Servers but was elimi-
nated by a security update for their web (HTTP) server.
The highlighted 404 code denotes that the request was
denied. As security updates from Microsoft become avail-
able the study web server is updated. At present there are
no known HTTP vulnerabilities which would allow an
unauthorized user to gain access to files on the server.
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